This review addresses the long-standing puzzle of how logic and probability fit together in human reasoning. Many cognitive scientists argue that conventional logic cannot underlie deductions, because it never requires valid conclusions to be withdrawn -not even if they are false; it treats conditional assertions implausibly; and it yields many vapid, although valid, conclusions. A new paradigm of probability logic allows conclusions to be withdrawn and treats conditionals more plausibly, although it does not address the problem of vapidity. The theory of mental models solves all of these problems. It explains how people reason about probabilities and postulates that the machinery for reasoning is itself probabilistic. Recent investigations accordingly suggest a way to integrate probability and deduction.
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The nature of deductive reasoning To be rational is to be able to make deductions -to draw valid conclusions from premises. A valid conclusion is one that is true in any case in which the premises are true [1] . In daily life, deductions yield the consequences of rules, laws, and moral principles [2] . They are part of problem solving, reverse engineering, and computer programming [3] [4] [5] [6] and they underlie mathematics, science, and technology [7] [8] [9] [10] . Plato claimed that emotions upset reasoning. However, individuals in the grip of moderate emotions, even those from illnesses such as depression or phobia, reason better than controls, although only about matters pertaining to their emotion [11, 12] . Deductive reasoning is an ability that varies vastly from one person to another, correlating with their intelligence and with the processing capacity of their working memory [13] [14] [15] . Our topic is the cognitive foundation of deductive reasoning, and we ask two fundamental questions: (i) Does deduction depend on logic [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] ? (ii) How does deduction fit together with probabilities?
The first question is timely because of proposals that probability is the basis of human reasoning [21] [22] [23] . The second question has engaged theorists from the economist John Maynard Keynes [24] onward. Here we address both questions. We begin with logic (see Glossary) and present the arguments that logic alone cannot characterize deductive competence. These arguments motivated the turn to probability -a pivot that its proponents refer to as the 'new paradigm' [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] . Next, we outline the theory of mental models [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] , which combines set theory with psychological principles. Finally, we present recent studies that suggest how to integrate deduction and probability.
Problems for logic as a theory of deductive reasoning An ancient proposal is that deduction depends on logic (see also [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] ). Sentential logic concerns inferences from premises such as conjunctions ('and') and disjunctions ('or'). Like most logics, it has two parts: proof theory and model theory [35] . Proof theory contains formal rules of inference for proofs. One major rule of inference in most formalizations is:
A ! C A therefore, C where A and C can be any sentences whatsoever, such as: '2 is greater than 1' ! '1 is less than 2'.
Proof theory specifies rules containing logical symbols such as !, but not their meanings. Model theory defines their meanings. It specifies the truth of simple sentences such as '2 is greater than 1' with respect to a model, such as the natural numbers, and the truth of compound sentences containing connectives, such as !, which is known as material implication. The meaning of A ! C is defined as follows: it is true in any case except when A is true and C is false [1] and so it is analogous to 'if A then C'. This definition can be summarized in a truth table (Table 1) . Model theory therefore determines the validity of inferences: a valid inference is one in which the conclusion is true in all cases in which the premises are true.
Logic is extraordinarily powerful and underlies the theory of computability [35] [36] [37] . Many cognitive scientists have accordingly supposed that human reasoning depends on unconscious formal rules of inference [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . The hypothesis is plausible, but it runs into three difficulties.
First, conventional logic is monotonic; that is, if an inference is valid, its conclusion never needs to be withdrawn -not even when a new premise contradicts it. A contradiction validly implies any conclusion whatsoever [1] . However, human reasoners faced with a solid fact tend 18 . NUMBER OF PAGES to withdraw any conclusion that it contradicts. Some theorists therefore defend so-called 'non-monotonic' or 'defeasible' logics developed in artificial intelligence, which allow conclusions to be withdrawn [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] .
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Second, conditional assertions (e.g., 'If she insulted him then he's angry') occur in all sorts of reasoning. However, they do not correspond to any connective in sentential logic. Theorists have treated them as material implications [16] [17] [18] [19] , but this interpretation yields deductions of the following sort:
He's angry. Therefore, if she insulted him then he's angry. As the truth table for A ! C shows (Table 1 ), whenever C is true, the material implication is true. The preceding inference is therefore valid on this interpretation. It is also valid to infer a material implication from the falsity of A; for example:
She didn't insult him. Therefore, if she insulted him then he's angry. However, people usually reject both sorts of inference [43] , which are called the 'paradoxes' of material implication. They are a major motivation for alternative foundations for human reasoning [21] [22] [23] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] .
Third, logic yields infinitely many valid conclusions from any set of premises but many of them are vapid, such as a conjunction of the same premise with itself some arbitrary number of times; for example, 'A, therefore, A and A and A'. Logic alone cannot characterize sensible inferences [8, 30, 31] . Psychological theories based on logic therefore resort to extralogical methods to prevent vapid inferences [18] [19] [20] . No one knows to what degree these methods work without preventing useful inferences.
A further practical difficulty is that formal rules of inference apply, not to sentences, but to logical forms that match those of the formal rules of inference. No computer program exists for extracting logical forms from sentences in natural language, let alone from the propositions that sentences express in context. No one knows in full how to identify these forms from their shadows cast in sentences [44] .
Probability logic
As a consequence of the preceding arguments, some cognitive scientists propose that probability should replace logic. Their theories differ in detail but overlap enough to have a label in common -the new paradigm [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] . We refer to the paradigm as 'probability logic' or 'p-logic' for short. It presupposes that degrees of belief correspond to subjective probabilities [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] , an idea that not all psychologists accept [50, 51] . It focuses on conditionals, and one p-logician even allows that conventional logic could apply to other sorts of assertion [47] . P-logic's proponents engage with four main hypotheses.
First, individuals fix their degree of belief in a conditional, using Ramsey's test [45] . To assess, say, 'If she insulted him then he's angry', they add the content of the if-clause (she insulted him) to their beliefs and then assess the likelihood of the then-clause (he's angry).
Second, Ramsey's test or an analogous concept of a conditional event [46] defines the conditions in which a conditional is true or false. As Table 1 shows, they yield Glossary Bayesian net: a directed graph in which each node represents a variable and arrows from one node to another represent conditional dependencies. It captures the complete joint probability distribution in a parsimonious way. Consistency: a set of assertions is consistent if they can all be true at the same time.
Counterexample: in an inference, a possibility to which the premises refer but which is inconsistent with the conclusion. Deductive reasoning: a process designed to draw a conclusion that follows validly from premises; that is, the conclusion is true in any case in which the premises are true. Defeasible logics: also known as 'non-monotonic' logics. Unlike conventional logic, they allow conclusions to be weakened or withdrawn in the face of facts to the contrary. Defective truth table: a truth table for a conditional, 'if A then C', that has no truth value when A is false (also known as the de Finetti truth table). The Equation: the probability of a conditional, 'if A then C', equals the conditional probability of 'C given A'. Kinematic model: a mental model that unfolds in time to represent a temporal succession of events. Logic: the discipline that studies the validity of inferences. There are many logics, normally comprising two main components: proof theory, which stipulates rules for the formal derivation of proofs; and model theory, which is a corresponding account of the meanings of logical symbols and of the validity of inferences. In sentential logic, each proof corresponds one to one with a valid inference, but for other, more powerful logics not every valid inference can be proved. Logical form: the structure of a proposition that dovetails with the formal rules of inference in a logic. No computer program exists to recover the logical form of propositions in daily life. Material implication: a compound assertion in logic whose truth table is presented in Table 1 in main text. It is sometimes taken to correspond to a conditional, 'if A then C'. This view leads to logically valid but unacceptable 'paradoxes' such as that C implies 'if A then C'. Mental model: an iconic representation of a possibility that depicts only those clauses in a compound assertion that are true. The mental models of a disjunction, 'A or B but not both' accordingly represent two possibilities: possibly(A) and possibly(B). Model theory: the component of a logic that accounts for the meaning of sentences in the logic and for valid inferences. Modulation: the process in the construction of models in which content, context, or knowledge can prevent the construction of a model and can add information to a model. Monotonicity: the property in conventional logic in which further premises to those of a valid inference yield further conclusions. New paradigm: see probabilistic logic. Probabilistic logic (p-logic): a paradigm for reasoning that focuses on four hypotheses: Ramsey's test, the defective truth table, the Equation, and pvalidity. Proof theory: the branch of a logic that provides formal rules of inference that can be used in formal proofs of conclusions from premises. P-validity: an inference is p-valid if its conclusion is not more informative than its premises. Ramsey's test: to determine your degree of belief in a conditional assertion, add its if-clause to your beliefs and assess the likelihood of its then-clause. Recursive process: a loop of sequential operations performed either for a predetermined number of times or while a particular condition holds. If it has to be conducted an indefinite number of times, as in multiplication, it needs a working memory to hold intermediate results.
Syllogism: a form of inference that Aristotle formulated based on two premises and a conclusion, which each contain a single quantifier, such as 'all A', 'no A', or 'some A'. Systems 1 and 2: the two systems of reasoning postulated in dual-process theories of judgment and reasoning, in which system 1 yields rapid intuitions and system 2 yields slower deliberations. Many versions of the theory exist. Truth table: a systematic table showing the truth values of a compound assertion, such as a conjunction, as a function of the truth values of its clauses. Validity: in logic, an inference is valid if its conclusion is true in every case in which its premises are true. In everyday reasoning, its premises should also be true in every case in which its conclusion is true. Vapid deductions: valid inferences that yield useless conclusions, such as the conjunction of a premise with itself.
Feature Review
is, a model of the premises that is inconsistent with the conclusion. The mental model theory, however, is based on three psychological principles [31] [32] [33] 60] . First, each mental model represents a distinct set of possibilities. For example, the disjunction:
Pat visited England or she visited Italy, or both has three mental models, which we abbreviate using the names of Pat's destinations, although in reality models represent situations in the world: 1. England 2. Italy 3.
England Italy Second, mental models represent only what is true in a possibility: what is false is left implicit. For example, the first model above does not represent that it is false that Pat visited Italy. This 'principle of truth' reduces the load on processing but yields systematic fallacies, which we illustrate below.
Third, with deliberation reasoners can use the meaning of assertions to flesh out mental models into fully explicit models. For the disjunction above, they are: 1.
England not-Italy 2.
not-England Italy 3.
England Italy
The disjunction is true provided that each of these three cases is possible. Content, context, and knowledge can modulate fleshing out. For example, with a disjunction such as: Pat visited Milan or she visited Italy modulation blocks the model of Pat visiting Milan but not Italy because it is impossible, and so the assertion has only these two models of her visits: 1.
Milan Italy 2.
Italy. Like other 'dual-process' theories (e.g., [26, [61] [62] [63] [64] ), the mental model theory depends on two systems. System 1 constructs mental models. It is rapid but often errs because it cannot use working memory to store intermediate results. System 2 has access to working memory and so can perform recursive processes such as the construction of fully explicit models, but is fallible when working memory becomes overloaded. Nevertheless, valid inferences deriving from mental models should be easier than those requiring fully explicit models [60] . One of the theory's major differences from logic and p-logic is that reasoning can depend on kinematic models that unfold in time [8, [30] [31] [32] [33] . Box 2 illustrates how they work.
Mental models solve the three problems for logic. The first problem is that everyday reasoning is not monotonic. Suppose, for instance, you believe that:
If someone pulled the trigger, then the gun fired. Someone pulled the trigger. However, you then discover that, in fact:
The gun did not fire. What would you infer? Most people try to explain what might have happened [65] and conclude, for example, that:
Someone emptied the chamber and so there were no bullets in the gun. Hence, contrary to many philosophical accounts (following [66] ), individuals do not always accommodate an inconsistent fact with a minimal change to their beliefs [67] . Instead, they simulate what might have happened, generating a mental model (or models) of the situation that explain the inconsistency [65] , and they rate such explanations as more probable than minimal changes [68] . Explanations of this sort depend on mental models and have the advantage of providing a guide to action. Neither non-monotonic logic nor p-logic creates explanations.
The mental model theory requires no special logic for the task ( pace [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] ). Simulation can be performed within a protected environment -an intellectual laboratory to try out hypotheses -to model other individuals' inferences, to envisage causal interventions or counterfactual possibilities, and to explain inconsistencies [65, [68] [69] [70] . As a computer implementation shows, models are crucial at all stages [65] . First, an inconsistency is detected between the premises and the fact: they have no model in common. Facts weaken a belief that has a mental model inconsistent with them and so the fact that the gun did not fire weakens the conditional belief above rather than the categorical belief. The facts are accordingly updated to:
Someone pulled the trigger and the gun did not fire. Finally, these facts trigger a search in knowledge for an explanation, where knowledge itself takes the form of fully Box 1. The application of p-logic to syllogistic reasoning Aristotle formulated the logic of syllogisms. These dominated logic for two millennia and the psychology of reasoning for many decades. They have two premises and a conclusion, each in one of four moods: 'all A are B', 'no A is a B', 'some A are B', or 'some A are not B'. For example:
Some Greeks are men. Some men are athletes. An end term (e.g., 'Greeks') is in one premise, whereas a middle term (e.g., 'men') is in both premises. Middle terms have four possible arrangements, depending on whether they are first or last in each premise. Hence, there are 64 possible pairs of premise: 27 of them yield valid deductions interrelating the end terms and 31 yield p valid inferences [114] . Syllogisms vary vastly in difficulty: 7 year old children can cope with the easiest, whereas adults struggle with the hardest [88] . Given the premises above, many reasoners infer:
Therefore, some Greeks are athletes. The inference is invalid, because the men who are Greeks need not be the men who are athletes. According to the 'probability heuristics model' [114] , the inference is not a failure in logical reasoning but a success in p logic, because p(Greek & athlete) > 0. Granted that premises can be ranked in order of decreasing informativeness ('all', 'most', 'few', 'some', 'none',' some are not'), reasoners can use three main heuristics to converge on p valid conclusions.
(i) The preferred conclusion has the same quantifier as the least informative premise. In our example, the two premises have the same quantifier and so the preferred conclusion is one with the quantifier 'some', too. (ii) The next most preferred conclusion is a p valid implication of the preceding conclusion; for example, 'Some are not .' (iii) If the least informative premise has an end term as its subject, it is the subject of the conclusion; otherwise, the end term in the other premise is the subject of the conclusion. The virtue of p logic is that it extends to quantifiers, such as 'most A', that are outside traditional syllogisms and that cannot be defined using the standard quantifiers of 'first order' logic in which variables range over individuals but not over properties (i.e., sets of individuals) [126] . The preceding heuristics and two other less important ones yield predictions about the conclusions that reason ers should draw for each of the 64 possible pairs of syllogistic premises. We assess these predictions below.
conditional probabilities tend to violate the complete joint probability distribution (see below).
Conditionals have a defective truth table. Some experiments corroborate its predictions (e.g., [72] ) but others do not [73] . Also, consider this conditional:
If God exists then atheism is wrong. It is true. Its defective truth table ( Table 1 ) therefore implies that its if-clause is true:
Therefore, God exists. The inference is a valid deduction from a true premise and so is a sound proof for the existence of God. One way to avoid such bizarre proofs is to abandon truth for 'truthiness' and to treat the meaning of conditionals as conditional probabilities satisfying the Equation. This solution seems implausible, because conditionals can certainly be true (and false). Nevertheless, some theorists have endorsed it [21, 47] or analogous proposals [74] .
The probability of 'C if A' equals the conditional probability of 'C given A'. Some studies support the Equation, although to varying degrees [54, [75] [76] [77] [78] [79] [80] , and others do not [81, 82] . It may fail because of ignorance of the probability calculus: a recent study reports that the judgments of only a minority of well-educated individuals corroborated it and only for some sorts of conditional [83] .
Reasoners rely on p-validity in which a conclusion is never more informative than its premises. The hypothesis explains the acceptance of certain invalid conclusions but, as we show presently, its account of syllogistic reasoning (Box 1) is of only middling accuracy.
The theory of mental models makes three crucial predictions that distinguish it from other accounts, as follows.
The principle of truth predicts the occurrence of systematic fallacies. They can be compelling cognitive illusions. Some of them concern conditionals [84] and are sometimes open to alternative explanations, but those based on disjunctions are hard to explain without the principle of truth [85] [86] [87] . Consider, for example, this problem: 1. Either the pie is on the table or else the cake is on the table. 2. Either the pie isn't on the table or else the cake is on the table.
Could both of these assertions be true at the same time? Most people answer 'yes': the mental models of both assertions represent the cake on the table [87] . However, the fully explicit models of the two disjunctions have no model in common:
1.
2. pie not-cake not-pie not-cake not-pie cake pie cake Hence, the correct answer is 'no'. Participants tend to be wrong about such illusory inferences but to be right about control inferences for which mental models yield the correct answer.
Reasoners should spontaneously use counterexamples to refute invalid deductions. They do so most often to refute conclusions that are consistent with the premises but that do not follow from them [88] [89] [90] . Figure 1 shows a particular region of the brain, the right frontal pole, that becomes active in reasoning only during a search for counterexamples [91] .
Valid inferences should be easier from mental models (system 1) than from fully explicit models (system 2). They should be faster and more accurate. Experiments have corroborated this prediction for all of the main domains of reasoning, including reasoning about spatial, temporal, sentential, and quantified relations. Table 3 cites studies examining these three predictions.
A small demonstration may help you sharpen your intuitions. Would you accept or reject the following inference?
Viv visited Ireland or Scotland, but not both of them. Therefore, Viv visited Ireland or Scotland, or both of them. If you reject this inference, neither logic nor p-logic explains your reasoning because the inference is both valid and p-valid. It is valid because the conclusion holds in any case in which the premise holds [1] . It is p-valid because the conclusion holds in both cases in which the premise holds and in an additional case, and so the conclusion is less informative than the premise [47] . However, the inference is not valid in the model theory because the two cases to which the premise refers do not establish that it is possible that Pat visited both countries. So, mental models explain your rejection of the inference and other similar examples. If it rained then it was cold has the mental model: rain cold However, deliberation can lead to its fully explicit models [71, 128] , which are summarized in Table 1 in main text: rain cold not rain not cold not rain cold
The same order occurs developmentally in children's interpretations of conditionals and the capacity of working memory predicts the number of possibilities that they envisage [129, 130] . Modulation can block any model of a conditional [71] . For example, 'If it rains then it'll pour' has no model in which it pours but does not rain, because the meaning of 'pours' implies that it rains. If modulation blocks a conditional's mental model, however, it refutes the conditional. Experiments have corroborated modulations, including those that establish temporal and spatial relations between the events that a conditional describes [71, 131, 132] . Basic conditionals those unaffected by modulation refer to the three possibilities above. They are analogous to the truth table for material implication (see Table 1 in main text) and that analogy has misled many theorists into supposing that the model theory treats basic conditionals as material implications (e.g., [23, 71, 75, 79] (see the results in [123] [124] [125] ). It leaves open several outstanding questions (Box 5). However, it does argue that counterexamples are fundamental to human rationality. So, if counterexamples to its principal predictions occur, the theory will at least explain its own refutation.
Box 5. Outstanding questions
How robust is the Equation that p(if A then C) equals p(CjA) (see Table 2 in main text)? Does it depend on the use of Ramsey's test? If so, then, as some p logicians have wondered [21] , how is the test computed? Multiple quantifiers occur in assertions; for example, 'all the CEOs that have some assistants who know all their firm's plants are happy'. The logic required for these assertions is more complex than sentential or syllogistic logic [1] and there are a few psychological studies of the domain [20, 31] . How do individuals make inferences from such assertions? According to the mental model theory, conditionals refer to a conjunction of possibilities. So, a single piece of evidence such as 'not A & C' cannot be used to determine whether a conditional, 'if A then C', is true or false. Is the apparent evidence for the defective truth table a result of posing an impossible task to participants [150, 151] ? Do kinematic models underlie reasoning about causal relations and counterfactuals? Some dual process theories of reasoning contrast inferences based on probabilities and those based on counterexamples [152] , and evidence corroborates these theories [153, 154] . How ever, other dual process theories contrast emotion and reasoning [155] and bias from beliefs and no bias from beliefs [156] . Is it feasible to integrate all of these accounts? Massive differences occur in deductive ability and in susceptibility to bias from beliefs [156] . Some of the variance reflects the processing capacity of working memory (e.g., [157 159] 
